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Abstract  
  
Due to different institutional interpretations, there is a broad set of perceptions and attitudes towards 
bribery and corruption. Especially in the international business context, it is not likely to have a 
uniform understanding and consensus regarding the interpretation and the handling of these behaviours. 
This paper analyses the corruption environment in Latin America. Based on analysing the specific case 
of the firm PetroTiger Ltd., which was engaged in bribery activities with the Colombian state-
controlled firm Ecopetrol S.A. in 2010, this study finds characteristics of corruption in the Latin 
American region. This research distinguishes itself from the existing literature since it provides new 
insights in one specific region, including a broad set of dimensions and approaches. A compilation of 
desk research, media analysis and the Latin American Corruption Perception Index by the  
Transparency International underpins the corruption in this region. The primary findings show that the 
Latin American region differs from others because its level of perceived corruption is defined by its 
strong cultural influences, the internal economic drivers of Latin American firms, and the weak 
enforcement of legislation. Above all, this paper confirms that each region has its own characteristics 
and that the global perception on corruption is changing negatively. Taking this into account, this 
research explains the main causes for Latin America, and here for gives insights for further research 
that specific focusses on the cultural, economic or legal factors.  
Introduction  
  
During the last decade in Latin America, more and more companies are expanding their businesses to 
foreign markets (Cuervo-Cazurra 2010, Dunning and Lundan 2008, Vargas-Hernandez, Pelayo Maciel 
and Lopez Moralez 2013). The network and knowledge of these firms are increasing and financial 
power leads to a stronger position of these firms (Fagre and Wells 1982, Mudambi and Navarra 2004,  
Root 1988), whereby public pressure increases such that it becomes a responsible actor in society 
(Werhane 2012). Through this, the relationship between multinationals and their stakeholders ends up 
resulting in an unbalanced plight of power. The power of multinationals in various countries indicates an 
unstable distribution of power in relation to the society that they are operating in. Nowadays, firms 
consist of half of the hundred biggest economies in the world in comparison to economies countries 
themselves (Bettignies and Lepineux 2009). For example, firms like Wal-Mart Stores Inc. and Royal 
Dutch Shell show higher revenues in 2012 than the GDP of several countries such as Austria, South 
Africa or Colombia.   
Society and government assert that powerful multinationals should operate socially responsible (Carroll 
and Shabana 2010, Mohr, Webb and Harris 2001). This implies that transcending power of 
organizations through self-regulation and internal control will stay within universal norms and values 
of the international society reflected by (inter)national regulations and principles.  
One mainstream trend nowadays for large corporations is to develop a staunch Corporate Governance 
policy to eliminate unethical behaviour and corruption within the firm, such as bribery in this case.  
Although there is a correlation between corporate governance and the global level of corruption, there is 
still an increase of individual cases of bribery activities (Wu 2005). One example is the case of 
WalMart de Mexico in 2005:  Officials were bribed in order to speed up business activities in the 
country  
(Barstow and Xanic von Betrab 2012). Another comparable example is that of the German firm  
Siemens:  Greek officials were also bribed in the period starting from 1998 up until 2002 (BBC News 
Business 2011). Similarly, the UK firm BAE System was accused for bribes to foreign authorities in 
Saudi Arabia and Hungary in order to win contracts (Musgrove 2010). In addition, large multinationals 
operating in Latin America have also been found guilty of bribery. For instance, fashion firm Ralph 
Lauren bribed officials in Argentina between 2005 and 2009 to obtain paperwork for goods to clear 
customs and avoid inspections (Bloomberg 2013). The Brazilian aircraft firm Embraer S.A. is accused 
of bribing Argentinian and Dominican officials in the purchase of an aircraft for an amount of almost  
94 million USD (Dominican Today 2013).  
There is a substantial amount of published academic studies with regards to unethical behaviour of 
large corporations (Adams, Tashchian and Shore 2001, Palazzo 2007). This paper sheds light on the 
behaviour of multilatinas (multinationals from Latin America), and how these firms get tempted to 
overcome the excess the existing norms, values and (international) regulations within societies. This 
paper contributes to the existing literature on bribery, since it extends previous research by 
investigating if the same patterns of bribery worldwide are also applicable within Latin America. This 
will be done by analysing the case study of the company PetroTiger Ltd. accused for bribery activities 
of the mutilatina Ecopetrol S.A. Is there a difference in bribery activities and corruption of multilatinas 
in comparison to multinationals from outside the region? Complementary to that, criminological 
perspectives are included whereby the behaviour of firms are analysed in  bribery sensitive situations 
since institutional and cultural perceptions of corruption and bribery in particular may differ from one 
country or region to another (Clark and Cornish 2001). For instance, the United Nations‘ Global 
Compact declares as its principle Anti-Corruption: "Businesses should work against corruption in all its 
forms, including extortion and bribery‖ (UN Global Compact 2014).  
  
Literature Review  
  
This section summarizes previous published research on bribery and international business, and 
provides an understanding of how bribery can affect organizations and economies. Firstly, different 
perspectives of the terminology are discussed and to which extent bribery has different cultural values.  
Thereafter, the trends of bribery are shown, taking a closer look at international business in particular. 
Also, the effects of (international) regulations to combat bribery will be shown and in which way 
corruption affects specific business environments.  
Definition of bribery  
  
The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) describes bribery as the 
offering, promising or giving of something in order to influence a public official in the execution of 
his/her official duties (OECD Observer 2000, 3). Complementary to that, a bribe is a payment, in 
money or in kind, that involves a reciprocal obligation, and that aims at inducing the unethical 
behaviour of the person receiving the bribe (Rose-Ackerman 1999). Another author (Harvey 2001) 
argues that not all payments to a principle for any purpose is by definition a bribe, however, any 
payment made to an agent is a bribe if the payment is made to the agent rather than the principle and 
the agent does not forward or report the payment to the principle. Corporations have different 
explanations of what is mentioned by the terminology of bribery in their Code of Conduct. There is a 
need for a deeper explanation in business associations and international organizations with this 
meaning (Gordon and Miyake 2001).  
According to Gordon and Miyake (2001) there are three main operational difficulties that organizations 
have to cope with by what is mentioned with the terms corruption and bribery. First of all, firms have 
difficulties with drawing the line between acceptable relationship-building and corrupt practices or 
bribery. Another issue is the extortion and facilitation of payments where the problem lies in the 
finding of a formulation that recognizes the difficult situations that enterprises may face in certain 
business environments without creating a huge loophole in the anti-corruption guidelines. Finally the 
tolerance of different practices in different cultures could be an excuse for bribery practices. The latter 
is mainly relevant for multinationals when doing cross-cultural business.  
But in what way does bribery affect business environment? There are many contradicting researches 
about whether bribery activities have negative or positive implications. Based on the Criminal Division 
of the United States Department of Justice and the Enforcement Division of the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission (2012), bribery should be seen as a blockade for the free market 
system. Foreign corporate bribery affects the stability of overseas business and also the domestic 
competitive climate when domestic firms engage in such practices as a substitute for a healthy 
competition for foreign business. Besides that, other research shows that corruption leads to an increase 
of transaction costs and a decrease of incentives for foreign direct investment (Seligson 2002). 
Complementary to that, Hung Mo (2001) claims that the main channel through which corruption 
affects economic growth is political instability. The estimated annual amount of money circulating due 
to bribery is estimated on 1,000 billion USD (The World Bank 2013). The annual costs for the 
European Union each year for corruption, including bribery, is 120 billion euros (European 
Commission 2012). Furthermore, the increase of corruption also shows also a correlation with a 
decrease in GDP growth and GDP per capita (Dreher and Herzfeld 2005).What are the reasons that 
international firms become engaged in bribery activities? Carmichael (1995) explains three modes of 
why those firms feel the need for this behaviour. First, in certain countries normal business activities 
can not be initiated or completed without paying bribes. Also, the justification of  ―everybody does it‖ 
encourages firms to demonstrate this behaviour. Finally, firms which are in desperate need for business 
may resort to bribery (Carmichael 1995). Complementary to Carmichael‘s approach, other research 
classifies three sources of bribery: (1) economic factors, (2) cultural factors and (3) legal factors 
(Sanyal 2005). Examples of the execution of bribery include  winning contracts, influencing a 
procurement process, circumventing the rules for importation of products, gaining access to nonpublic 
bid tender information, evading taxes or penalties, influencing the adjudication of lawsuits or 
enforcement actions, obtaining exceptions to regulations and avoiding contract terminations (U.S. 
Department of Justice & U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2012). The term bribery –so as the 
executions above- is not that clearly defined whether it is a crime or not, but it is generally accepted as 
being a crime (Finckenauer 2005).  
Bribery in International Business  
  
There are several published studies with respect to the increasing amount of bribery done in 
international business (Sanyal 2005, Sanyal and Samanta 2004, Baughn, et al. 2010, McKinney and 
Moore 2008). According to Baugh et al. (2010) this is mainly has to do with increasing globalization, 
leading to cross-border business transactions between societies with very different norms and 
regulations regarding bribery. The explanation for the willingness to bribe abroad depends both on 
domestic (economic development, culture, and domestic corruption in the supplying country) and 
international factors (those countries‘ patterns of trade and involvement in international accords). 
Based on Baughn et al. (2010) there are three situations when the propensity to provide bribes is the 
lowest: (1) when corruption is not tolerated in the multinational firms‘ home countries, (2) when the 
firms‘ home countries were signatories of the OECD anti-bribery convention, and (3) when those 
countries trade heavily with wealthier nations. Other research shows that bribery in international trade 
is driven by push and pull forces showing that multinationals are proactive parties as it come to seeking 
pro bribery conditions in exporting countries instead of being victims of corruption in host countries 
(Sung 2005). Depending on the financial performance of a corporation and the health of an economic 
environment defines whether a firm would act socially responsible or not. If a firm shows bad financial 
features, the chance it would engage in bribery is more likely (Campbell 2007).  
As mentioned earlier a weak legal system, poor financial market and high policy uncertainty is 
correlated with the bribe sensitivity of firms in that particular country (Tsalikis and LaTour 1995). 
Other research also shows that corruption which is associated with poor institutions has a negative 
effect on the growth of a country‘s GDP. In case of other sorts of corruption that is not related to 
governance characteristics shows the opposite. In that case corruption helps in overcoming inefficient 
barrier (Mironov 2005). From the FDI perspective, the higher the level of corruption in a host country 
is, less inward FDI takes place (Wei 2000). This mainly has to do with the fact that foreign investors 
avoid countries with corruption because investors see it as unethical behaviour which may impede 
operational activities (Habib and Zurawicki 2002).  
The attitude towards bribery is not only based on the characteristics of a firm but also the environment 
of doing business that affects the firm's bribery decision (Chen, Yasar and Rejesus 2008). Culture plays 
an important role showing that corrupt behaviour differs in each country due to norms and cultural 
systems (Hooker 2009). Based on the Cultural Dimensions of Hofstede, research reveals differences 
between cultures towards the engagement in bribery. According to the Cultural Dimensions theory, 
individuals that from countries with low power distance, low long-term orientation or high 
individualism are less likely to engage in bribery. However, the level of economic development of a 
country should also be taken into consideration when analysing these countries' cultural aspects 
(Sanyal and Guvenli 2009). Therefore, cultural differences along with other environmental aspects 
between countries should be taken into considerations. Also, the different perceptions that people have 
towards the ethical norms of bribery play an important role. For example, one study shows that 
between men and women, there is a different perception and approach of handling bribe giving and/or 
taking. The results showed that women are more resistant against this form of corruption (Guvenli and 
Sanyal 2012).  
International regulations and bribery  
  
Many monitor international organizations have their official policy, statements or agreements towards 
bribery or corruption such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption (October 2006),  
Criminal Law Convention of Corruption by the Council of Europe (October 2000) and the 
AntiCorruption Policy by the EU. In this paper the two most relevant agreements are briefly discussed:  
a. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)  
  
This regulation, which was established in 1977 in the United States by the Department of Justice and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, was the first federal law implemented by all countries which 
prohibited persons or entities in engaging in bribery activities with foreign government officials or 
foreign political parties. FCPA is divided into two parts: the anti-bribery provision and the accounting 
provision. The first provision consists of three parts, which aims to (1) prohibit any payment –anything 
of value- to a (2) foreign official in order to (3) obtain or retain business. The latter provision refers to a 
more transparent and openness of the firms' (internal) audits, whereby the books and records show a 
detailed, accurate and fair reflection of transactions. The federal US authorities are aggressively 
investigating firms whether they are in compliance with this Act. The punishment for violating is 
mostly dealt with by imposing high fines. Nowadays, a majority of developed countries have adopted 
this legislation into their own national regulation (The United States Department of  
Justice 2013, Worldcompliance 2013, FCPA Professor 2012, ICAEW 2014).  
Shortly after the introduction of the FCPA, there was thorough research done regarding the 
effectiveness of such legislation (Baruch 1979, Graham 1984, Siegel 1979). Up until 2014 there 
remains mixed thoughts about whether regulating bribery in a society is viable. One of the criticisms 
towards the FCPA is that this law was established to define the terminology of what is mentioned by 
bribery in the United States. Although as mentioned earlier, the line between what is acceptable or not 
is remains unclear. The law does not clarify enough whether a payment is considered as a bribe or not. 
This eventually led to confusion for companies who did not want to take the risk of violating the law. 
Companies became more cautious towards international trade which eventually led to missed business 
opportunities (Beed, Fleming and Shooshtari 2007). Another argument is that a bribe is culturally 
dependent. This cultural dependency makes it unmanageable for firms to define per country where they 
do business whether a particular payment is seen as a bribe. The FCPA has done less business in 
foreign countries (Beed, Fleming and Shooshtari 2007). Another criticism is that the FCPA is deeply 
focused on one side of bribery. Since a bribe involves two parties, the supply and the demand side, both 
should be investigated. This law unfortunately was more focused on the supplier side, lacking 
regulation towards the demand side. A fourth argument is that the legislation only works if more 
countries participate. Since FCPA was introduced only in the United States, the effectiveness of this 
law was not visible, especially in its earliest years of implementation (Kaikati, et al. 2000). Finally, 
other studies put into perspective that this regulation has had little general positive impact. More 
important this research concludes, is the message behind what should be seen as courageous attempt of 
the United States to address the rising concerns towards bribery in the global business environment 
(Cragg and Woof 2002).  
b. Organization of American States (OAS)  
  
Although not as influential and important as the two first agreements discussed,  the Organization of 
American States is relevant for understanding the regulation process of the Latin American market. The 
Organization was established in order to achieve among its member states an order of peace and 
justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, 
their territorial integrity, and their independence (Organization of American States 2014). Today, the 
OAS consists  of 35 independent states of the American continent and constitutes the main political, 
juridical, and social governmental forum in the hemisphere (Organization of American States 2014).  
Since 1996, there was an international anti-corruption legal instrument initiated among its members. 
Since 2002, the Inter-American Convention against Corruption and the Follow-Up Mechanism for its 
Implementation (MESICIC) was introduced, with the aim to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate 
corruption in the Americas (Organization of American States 2011).  
Research shows that regulations such as the OAS are an important eye opener for the recognition of the 
existence of bribery in Latin America. Only important to take into account that Latin American 
countries, which are mostly seen as masculine regions, the consequences of violating the law are not so 
effective. As such,  there should be a more enforced implementation of the agreements done by the 
OAS to improve the effectiveness (Husted 2002). Other studies  argue that regulation is necessary in 
Latin America because bribery is significantly distorting the firm growth in the Latin American region.  
This especially true for young firms who suffer from this type of business environment (The World 
Bank 2012). Apart from that, other studies conclude  that conventions such as the OECD and OAS are 
effective in Latin America, and as supported above, the strong cultural –masculine- aspects should be 
taking into account for further development of policies in this regard (Husted 2002).  
In conclusion, there are mixed outcomes about whether bribery activities should be prohibited or in 
what way it should be regulated. As seen above, each convention or act has its own negative and 
positive aspects. Although in general we can conclude that bribery leads to distortion of the GDP of a 
country (Irish Anticorruption 2013). The difficult part is how this negative issue should be approached. 
Not all legislations and regulations are that helpful to combat bribery. Regulation can lead to less 
attractive business environments, which leads to less trade with other (corrupted) countries, and as a 
result may lead to also a decrease in GDP (D'Souza 2012). The implementation of regulations should  
be seen more as the global standards of the norms within international trade taking place (Cragg and  
Woof 2002).  
Research Methodology  
  
This paper based on qualitative approach contains an analysis of the case of PetroTiger Ltd. and 
Ecopetrol S.A. explaining the bribery-scandal that took place in 2010, focusing on the first mentioned 
firm. The analysis will look at the drivers of the firm's involvement in bribery activities, the 
environment in which the bribery took place and the home country‘s institutional attitudes towards 
bribery. In this research methodology, data-gathering and data-analysis are linked (Decorte and Zaitch 
2009). For this case study, data is analysed in order to explain one specific case, with the eventual goal 
of finding  patterns that occur in the Latin American region. Important to mention is that information is 
gathered from different sources, which is called data triangulation. Data triangulation will guarantee 
validity and reliability of the data by using multiple sources (Decorte and Zaitch 2009). The way of 
obtaining data is through (a) desk research, namely publicly available secondary sources, and (b) the 
Latin American Corruption Perception Index Analysis. Below both data are described, including the 
way of obtaining the data and the validity and reliability are underpinned. This paper also took into 
account media reports analysis. To ensure whether all available information was considered, this 
research has been carried out by obtaining information from several sources such as corporate websites, 
digital newspapers, press releases, corporate reports and websites.  Approaching this bribery scandal 
from six different media channels assures the availability of data. . The media reports analysis has the 
aim of analysing the bribery activities of PetroTiger Ltd. and Ecopetrol S.A. in 2010. The framework 
for this method is processed into three stages. Firstly, corporate information is collected. In this stage 
most of the information is acquired from official corporate websites. The next stage is dedicated to the 
bribery case itself. All media sources as mentioned before were used to present a uniform description 
of the whole bribery case. Validity of the information was pursuing since for each statement at least 
two media sources confirm the analysis. The latter stage is related to the interpretation of this particular 
bribery for the total Latin American region. Several theories and frameworks are used that fit in the 
overarching framework of Sanyal (2005) who states that corruption exists out of three sources: cultural, 
economic and legal. In Table 1, all media channels that were used as information resources are 
presented.  
 
TABLE 1 Selection of Media  
 
   Selection of Media     
  Media  Name  Language     
  Corporate website  Tiger Companies  English     
  Corporate website  PTS Colombia  English     
  Corporate website  Inelectra Internacional  English     
  Corporate website  Ecopetrol  English     
  Digital News paper  Bloomberg  English     
  Digital News paper  Corporate Crime Reporter  English     
  Digital News paper  BN Americas  English     
  Digital News paper  Law 360  English     
  Digital News paper  Colombia Reports  English     
  Digital News paper  Yahoo News  English     
  Digital News paper  The FCPA Blog  English     
  Digital News paper  Dinero  Spanish     
  Digital News paper  Caracol  Spanish     
  Digital News paper  El Tiempo  Spanish     
  Press Release  US Department of Justice  English      Press Release 
 US District Court of New Jersey English     
  Social Media  LinkedIn  Spanish     
  Sustainability Report Ecopetrol  English     
  Website  Rigzone  English     
              
         
a. Latin American Corruption Perception Analysis  
  
In addition to the desk research methods, the Latin American Corruption Perception Analysis by 
Transparency International analyses the case study of one bribery case and takes a closer look into the 
Latin American region as a whole. The Latin American Corruption Analysis is an analysis that is fully 
based on evidence obtained from the independent organization Transparency International.   
The concerns expressed by Transparency International (2013) are the increasing corruption worldwide in 
terms of the number of cases and the countries getting involved in institutional corruption.   
In Table 2 the CPI features for 23 Latin American countries are presented into three time periods, 
showing the index score and world rank for each country. In the last two columns the alteration are 
shown between the period 2003-2013 and 2008-2013. According to the index, Latin American country 
Uruguay, with an index rate of 73, shows the lowest perception of corruption in Latin America. In 2003 
and 2008 Chile had the highest CPI.  
Although there is an increase of 13 percent in the Corruption Perception Index between 2003 and 2013 
in Latin American countries, there is still a concern about the overall perception of corruption in the 
Latin American region.   
Also remarkable are the features over the period of 2008 to 2013. Between 2003 and 2013 seven 
countries experienced significant growth in the perception of corruption. In the 5-years period, only 
Ecuador, Haiti and Brazil had a continuous growth rate. In 2003-2013 the average CPI growth was 13 
percent. During this period of time there was a declining growth of only 6 percent. On the other hand 
the number of countries with an extreme decrease of CPI is reduced. Only Mexico and Guatemala have 
a decrease of 6 percent over the last five years.  
 
TABLE 2 Corruption Perception Index: Latin America  
 
           Corruption Perception Index: Latin America        
       2013  2008  2003             
     Country  CPI Rank CPI Rank CPI Rank   Δ '03-'13 Δ '08-'13    
1 Uruguay  73  19  69  23  55  33    33%  6%    
2 Chile  71  22  69  22  74  20    -4%  3%    
3 Puerto Rico   62  33  58  36  NA  NA    NA  7%    
4 Costa Rica  53  49  51  47  43  50    23%  4%    
5 Cuba  46  63  43  65  46  43    0%  7%    
6 Brazil  42  72  35  80  39  54    8%  20%    
7 Peru  38  83  36  72  37  59    3%  6%    
8 El Salvador  38  83  39  67  37  59    3%  -3%    
9 Colombia  36  94  38  70  37  59    -3%  -5%    
10 Suriname   36  94  36  72  NA  NA    NA  0%    
11 Ecuador  35  102  20  151  22  113    59%  75%    
12 Panama  35  102  34  85  34  66    3%  3%    
13 Argentina  34  106  29  109  25  92    36%  17%    
14 Bolivia  34  106  30  102  23  106    48%  13%    
15 Mexico  34  106  36  72  36  64    -6%  -6%    
16 Guatemala  29  123  31  96  24  100    21%  -6%    
17 Dom Republic  29  123  30  102  33  70    -12%  -3%    
18 Nicaragua  28  127  25  134  26  88    8%  12%    
19 Guyana     27  136  26  126  NA  NA    NA  4%    
20 Honduras  26  140  26  126  23  106    13%  0%    
21 Paraguay  24  150  24  138  16  129    50%  0%    
22 Venezuela  20  160  19  158  24  100    -17%  5%    
23 Haiti  19  163  14  177  15  131    27%  36%    
     Total participants     177    180    133            
     Average CPI  37,8    35,6    33,5       13%  6%    
                                     
  For the countries Puerto Rico, Suriname and Guyana data is limited. The features for 2003 are not 
available.  
Based on data from the Transparency International Organization, The Corruption Perception Index  
2013 (Transparency International 2013)  
Case study Findings: PetroTiger Ltd. and Ecopetrol S.A.  
  
This section presents the firm-based analysis of PetroTiger Ltd. and Ecopetrol S.A., followed by the 
case study of their bribery activities in 2010 in which  three ex-executives of the firm PetroTiger Ltd. 
paid two major briberies in order to win contracts from the Colombian firm Ecopetrol S.A. The 
analysis is based on actual news reports of several agencies. The case study has been assessed taking 
into account several theoretical interpretations of bribery.  
PetroTiger Ltd.  
  
PetroTiger Ltd., a United States company registered as a British Virgin Island firm, specialized in 
hydrocarbon and infrastructure services; it is one of the largest post-drilling production services 
companies in Latin America. This multinational has been present since 2008 in in different regions all 
over Colombia. It is also active in different projects in countries such as Peru, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Alaska, Syria, Russia and Indonesia. Their presence in Colombia exists out of three acquisitions in a 
three-year period. The firm, which is part of the umbrella corporation TigerCompanies, acquired their 
first Colombian firm in 2008. In that year the Colombian firm Gómez Cajiao y Asociados S.A., which 
is specialized in engineering design and project management, became member of the group through 
60% ownership. A year later, the firm Production Testing Services (PTS), a petroleum production firm 
that is a market leader in the Andean Region, was acquired. The last firm got in July 2010 fully owned 
by TigerCompanies, which is the firm Inelectra Internacional, a corporation with 40 years of 
experience in the energy sector. After the last acquisition, the number of employees of PetroTiger Ltd. 
in total is estimated to be 1,500 (Rigzone 2014). Presently under the name of parent company 
TigerCompanies, three active subsidiaries are operating independently: PetroTiger Ltd., Inelectra 
Internacional and Gómez Cajiao.  
 
  (a) CSR policy is available for the public through the corporate website        
                 
Based on data from the corporate websites of Production Testing Services, Inelectra Internacional and 
Tiger Companies (Tiger Companies 2012, PTS Colombia 2009, Inelectra Internacional 2011)In 
production firms,  an HSEQ department is desired, which stands for Health, Safety, Environment and 
Quality. This department is supposed to adhere to these four pillars within the firm. PetroTiger Ltd. 
achieved several awards and certifications over the last years thanks to their HSEQ department. Some 
of their achievements are presented in Table 4.  
 
TABLE 4 Certification and Awards PetroTiger Ltd.  
 
   Certifications and Awards PetroTiger Ltd.     
 
  Year  Sort  Name  Main activities     
   2005 Certification  ISO 9001  Quality Management     
2007 Award  ARP SURA National  SURA Award     
2007 Award  ARP SURA Regional  SURA Award     
2008 Certification  OHSAS 18001  Safety Management     
2008 Certification  RUC: 99%  Colombian Safety Council     
2009 Award  Learning Award BP Contractors BP Award     
   2009 Certification  ISO 14001  Environmental Management     
   2011 Award  ARP SURA national  SURA Award     
            
Based on data from the corporate website of TigerCompanies (TigerCompanies 2012)  
Since 2013, the corporate website (hhtp://petrotiger.com) of PetroTiger Ltd. has had limited access 
Crucial information about the firm for the public such as international presence, history of the firm, 
sustainability projects and the Annual Report are not retrievable. It is unclear if there is any relation 
between the bribery activities of the firm and the current status of their corporate website. The parent 
firm TigerCompanies and its subsidiaries provide limited information about PetroTiger Ltd. on their 
corporate websites.  
Ecopetrol S.A.  
  
 As one of the biggest oil and gas services companies in Latin America and with yearly revenues of more 
than 30 million USD in these last few years, Ecopetrol S.A. is the industry market leader in  
Colombia. The corporation was founded in 1951 and is originally a Colombian state-controlled firm. 
Besides their operations in the host country, this multilatina is also present in several projects in Brazil, 
Peru and the Gulf of Mexico (Ecopetrol S.A. 2012). Currently the group firm exist out of 25 
subsidiaries in- and outside Colombia. In 2012, more than 60% of the revenues from the firm came 
from earnings outside the country.  
Ecopetrol has developed a CSR strategy which including several policies regarding their relation with 
stakeholders, corporate governance, human rights, sustainability and ethics (Ecopetrol 2014). 
Especially the latter one is worth mentioning since one of the pillars for this subject is their 
anticorruption plan. This plan brings to the attention the risks with regards to fraud, corruption, money 
laundering and terrorist financing which is in compliance with Article 73 of Law 1474 Anti-Corruption 
Status (Ecopetrol 2014). An important risk to mention is the award of third parties without reporting a 
conflict of interest, in exchange for personal favours and benefits. This risk has a high probability of 
occurrence.  
Case study: bribery activities PetroTiger Ltd. and Ecopetrol S.A.  
  
Media firm Bloomberg (2014) released on April 7, 2014 an article revealing that between the period 
June 2009 and February 2010 three ex-executives, Gregory Weisman, Joseph Sigelman and Knut 
Hammarskjold participated in paying bribes on behalf of the firm PetroTiger Ltd. to an official of the  
Colombian state-owned firm Ecopetrol S.A. Weisman was the former general counsel for the firm. 
Sigelman and Hammarskjold were both co-CEOs during that period. The two executives were charged 
guilty by the United States Department of Justice (2013, 2013) for the following accusations:  
 Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud (In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1349);  
 Conspiracy to Violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (In violation of Title 18, United States  
Code, Section 371);  
 Substantive violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (All in violation of Title 15, United 
States Code, Section 78dd-2, and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2.);  
 Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering (All in violation of Title 18, United States Code,  
Section 1956(h)).  
Ecopetrol S.A. is a state controlled firm and thus has the ability to assign contracts for projects in  
Colombia. The former executives of PetroTiger Ltd. paid bribes to an ex-official of the firm, David  
Orlando Durán Flórez, who was in charge over the approval and the allotment of contracts by Ecopetrol 
S.A. to secure approval for an oil service contract (Corporate Crime Reporter 2014). To obscure the 
payments that were made, the wife‘s official, the official's wife Johana Navarro Carvajal became 
involved (BN Americas 2014). PetroTiger Ltd transferred several payments to the official's wife, under 
the guise of business consulting services for the firm. These activities were actually never carried out 
by Navarro Carvajal (United States District Court of New Jersey 2013). In order to win an oil services 
contract, which was worth approximately $39 million USD, the ex-executives of PetroTiger Ltd. paid 
an amount of around $333,500 USD (Law 360 2014, Colombia Reports 2014). One of the emails sent 
by Navarro, which was found by the FBI, confirms her role in this case. In the email, she thanked the 
ex-CEO for the payment transaction. She also stated that she was waiting the second payment for the 
next week (El Tiempo 2014). According to the resume of  Durán Flórez, he left Ecopetrol short after 
the bribery activities. Before the publicity of this case, he was no longer employed for the firm, 
according to his publicly available profile on LinkedIn (2014). Whether there is a relation between this 
bribery and Flórez' departure from the firm  is unconfirmed. One media reports his retirement in April 
2011 was his reason for leaving the firm (Caracol 2014).  
The case came into publicity when in 2011 a process started when the Board of Directors detected 
possible irregularities during an external audit. This led to a separation of the three ex-executives‘ 
positions by April 2011 (Yahoo News 2014).  
Another violation by these ex-executives, which is not fully related to bribery but worth mentioning, is 
their attempt  to secure kickbacks for an acquisition of a firm. Here for they increased the acquisition 
price of the target firm. Two of the owners agreed with this initiative of PetroTiger‘s executive, with 
the aim to kick back an amount of this purchase for own purpose. The payment was falsely justified 
within a side letter under the name ―Manilla Split‖ (The FCPA Blog 2014). The payments were 
deposited into a bank account in the Philippines under the division of Manila, using the code name 
―Manilla Split‖ (Dinero 2014).  
Interpretation to the PetroTiger Ltd. and Ecopetrol S.A. bribery case according 
to the institutional frameworks  
  
From the above case, many questions remain unanswered due to lack of corporate information and the 
seclusion of the firm. It is clear that PetroTiger Ltd., its holding and sister entities took a step back in 
publicity. Their lack of transparency towards this bribery case, their current operational activities and 
the future CSR and business plan are a mystery. A classical approach to analyse this case from a 
criminological perspective is the Routine Activity Approach. This theory states that any offender who 
commits a crime always calculates rationally its costs and benefits. In this case the offender is 
PetroTiger Ltd. The theory also states that there are always persons inside organisations who will be 
ready to engage  into bribery activities (Clark and Cornish 2001).  PetroTiger Ltd. decided to employ 
displacement strategy, either physically disappearing from the attention of the public, or visually, 
whereby they actually remain at the same place in its operation and strategy, but not manifesting itself 
on internet or other public sources. This is an example of rationality and specific decision making as 
explained by the theory.  The lack of information is evidence in support of the theory  since it reveals 
the behaviour of the firm and their aversive attitude towards their responsibilities in society.   
To what extent is this firm fully guilty to the bribery activities in 2010? Sung (2005)  distinguished the 
push and pull forces of bribery in international trade.  The demand-pull forces include the role of 
multinationals as victims in host countries of international bribery whereas supply-push forces claims 
that multinationals are proactive in international bribery activities in host countries. His analysis shows 
that the supply-push forces are strongly supported by cross-national data. In the case of PetroTiger Ltd. 
it is evident that the proactive attitude of the firm was a key factor of the case of bribery in Colombia. 
The position of the firm is characterized by three factors: First of all it was PetroTiger Ltd. who was the 
party that initiated and thus wanted to benefit from this situation as they were eager to win this 
contract. In addition, as presented in the media analysis, the formal CEO‘s initiated the obscurement of 
payment transactions by transferring amounts of money to the wife of the Ecopetrol S.A. official. 
Finally, their proactive attitude reveals itself again since there was a second case in which the firm tries 
to secure kickbacks during an acquisition.  
However, it is too easy to blame all responsibilities only on one particular firm. Bribery always includes  
two or more parties (Sanyal and Guvenli 2009). There are more responsibility factors when it comes to 
international bribery. Sanyal (2005) explains three sources that contribute to the level of bribery and 
corruption in society, which include culture, economy and legality. Using this theory as a basis, the 
impact in international bribery is described within (1) the case of PetroTiger Ltd., (2) the Latin American 
region and (3) using theories that underpin the importance of each source.  
Cultural  
  
The cultural dimensions of Hofstede were previously analysed and it was found that for the Latin 
American region there is a relation between the level of corruption and the cultural Power Distance of a 
country‘s culture. As shown in Table 5, the majority of the Latin American countries show a strong 
cultural power distance, which explains the features  regarding the high corruption scores in this 
particular region. This major presence of corruption has high influence on the economic opportunities 
and business growth in the Latin American region (Charoensukmongkol and Sexton 2011).  
In the case of PetroTiger Ltd., it is a firm  founded in the United States and thus holds different cultural 
business values compared to Latin American firms. For example, the Power Distance in Colombia is 
higher than in the United States showing that both countries have different attitudes and values towards 
inequality (Hofstede 2014). In Colombia inequality is more accepted as part of society than in the 
country of origin of PetroTiger Ltd. Relating these cultural aspects, the business environment for the 
firm was more attractive to engage in briberies then in their home market.  
Economic  
  
Based on research of Carmichael (1995), there are three reasons from an economic perspective of why 
a firm engages itself in bribery. The first is that in certain countries, normal business transactions can 
not be initiated or completed without paying bribes. There is a need to bribe officials in order to 
continue businesses and operations in a country. The second reason is the neutralization method in 
which ―everybody does it‖ is used as a legitimate argument to engage in corruption.  It also refers to a 
firm that is in desperate need for business and revenue, therefore they will  neglect their internal values 
to make sure that the existence of the firm will still be intact.  
In the case of PetroTiger Ltd. all three factors play an important role explaining the reasons for their 
bribery activities. Since Colombia is ranked 94
th
 in 2013 in the level of corruption, and corruption is 
still entrenched in the business environment of the country, it is necessary for firms to pay bribes in 
order to fulfil business operations in Colombia. Although Ecopetrol S.A. has a staunch sustainability 
report on how to avoid corruption within the firm, this particular case also shows that  Ecopetrol S.A. 
may not have a reliable and trustworthy way towards their customers on how several contracts are 
obtained. It is likely that PetroTiger Ltd. could not trust that the contract provided by the 
statecontrolled firm would be granted to the firm with the best business proposal. Also, the 
neutralization argument that bribery and corruption is a fully ‗accepted‘ business method in Colombia 
justifies their behaviour.  This might be an explanation to the number of firms  and officials in 
Colombia engaged in these activities. A good example is the case against ex-president Alvaro Uribe, 
who was involved in a bribery scandal with congress members in order to be supported for his re-
election in 2006 (Colombia Reports 2012). The fact that such cases take place in Latin America on 
regular basis allows firms such as PetroTiger Ltd. to justify their engagement in bribery. The desperate 
need for firms to win business contracts and their engagement in bribery is explained by the 
aforementioned economic reason. Since the financial statements of PetroTiger Ltd. are not available to 
the public, there are not enough insights into their economic position in the market. However, we have 
seen that the oil company acquired three Colombian firms in a short period of time and that all of the 
entities presented themselves as sustainable, experienced and market leading firms. Based on this we 
can assume that the economic position of PetroTiger Ltd. was stable. On the other hand, in 2008, the 
worldwide economic recession had an impact on the financial results of many firms. The petroleum 
sector particularly suffered from this downturn. Therefor it can be assumed that PetroTiger Ltd. short 
after the world crises had the desperate need to maintain business opportunities to stay sustainable.  
Legal  
  
Based on the literature review section in which several legal frameworks regarding bribery and 
corruption are discussed, we can deduce that in the case of PetroTiger Ltd., the Foreign Corruption 
Practices Act from the United States played the most important role in this case. The formal Co-CEO 
executives got convicted based on the FCPA legislation by the United States Department of Justice.  
The Latin American region has several global agreements implemented in their national regulation as 
mentioned in the literature review. A concern which was already addressed before is that in Latin 
American countries there is the willingness to combat against bribery with national regulations, OECD 
Convention, OAS and the UN Global Compact. However, enforcement is a big issue since countries do 
not have the tools, resources and collaboration with other countries to minimize bribery (Cragg and 
Woof 2002, Husted 2002).  
In the case of PetroTiger Ltd., the United States Department of Justice had a huge impact on the 
process of the trial, since the firm was in violation of its legislation. Concerning would have been the 
enforcement of the Colombian, or another Latin American department of Justice. As mentioned before, 
to strengthen enforcement for this region with regards to bribery there should be not only more tools 
related to the financial resources of a country, but also knowledge and support from other Latin  
American countries and other regions. Although Transparency International measured the Corruption 
Perception Index of Latin America, the number of Latin American cases in the media is not in line  with 
the high corruption score. It is there for typically that in Latin America there are more corrupted cases, 
however due to lack of enforcement not many cases are eventually prosecuted.  
Conclusion and discussion  
  
This paper states not only that the perception of bribery differ from region to region, but also the 
regulation and cultural acceptance fleshing the way a region copes with this phenomenon. As presented 
in the literature review there are several issues that disable the clear cut of the definition bribery and 
corruption in international business. As mentioned by Gordon and Miyake (2001) there are three 
difficulties in the expression of bribery and corruption in international business: (1) there is no clear cut 
definition of what bribery includes, (2) the issues of extortion and facilitation of payment payments and 
(3) each country or culture has its own interpretation of what is bribery and how to deal with it. 
However, despite the lack of a staunch framework of bribery, research claims that it eventually leads to  
slow down of the economy (Dreher and Herzfeld 2005, Hung Mo 2001, Seligson 2002). The two main 
features where for a firm engages in bribery activities are a weak economic environment and bad 
financial performance of a firm (Campbell 2007). Based on this there exists a vicious circle whereby 
corrupted firm deteriorate the country‘s economy. This downturn of the economic environment in its 
turn, is for more firms more justified reason to engage in bribery. The may be an explanation of the 
increasing briber in international business (Baughn, et al. 2010).  
The agreement of the Organization of the Americas (OAS) has an important role in the Latin American 
region.. This agreement includes 35 independent states of the American continent to combat bribery. 
Since 2002 the Inter-American Convention against Corruption was introduced with the aim to enforce 
stronger regulation in the Americas towards corruption. Despite the fact that corruption in a country is 
not influenced by regulation, but also by factors such as culture and economy (Sanyal 2005), this paper 
concludes that the implementation of the OAS regulation did somehow contribute to the less corrupted 
environment in the Latin American region. This conclusion is based on the Corruption Perception 
Index (Transparency International 2013), which will be further clarified below.  
The independent organization Transparency International (2013) presents annual corruption perception 
indexes (CPI) showing increased global concerns: the number of  cases of corruption increases while 
more and more countries have entrenched corruption in their institutions. Fortunately, this trend is less 
visible in the Latin American region. Based on features of 23 Latin American countries, measured over 
a period between 2003 and 2013, there was an increase in CPI of 13%. Uruguay and Chile show the 
best features by far,  both placing within the top 25 least-corrupt countries worldwide. With respect to 
the improvement of corruption of the last ten years, Ecuador and Paraguay progressed the most. The 
reason can be explained by that fact that both countries enforced strict corruption regulations in their 
national legislation.  
However, Transparency International also has concern about the Latin American region. First of all, 
there are still a few Latin American countries that are  at the bottom part of the list. Three countries are 
in the top 25 most corrupted countries worldwide: Haiti, Venezuela and Paraguay. Another reason for 
concern is that except for just a few Latin American countries, there is no considerable improvement 
for the majority of the participants. . Therefore, the average decrease of corrupted countries in Latin 
America is refers  to just a few countries that have progressed significantly. Most of the Latin countries 
show very little or no progress at all. The countries that stand out in a negative sense are the Dominican 
Republic and Venezuela, who show  increases of corruption of 12% and 17% between  
2003 and 2013.  Another concern is the figures between the time-periods of 2003-2013 and 20082013. 
Comparison shows that there is a declining decrease of corruption of only 6% in the last five years. 
However outliers in negative sense are reduced, just three countries show significant improvement of 
corruption.  
In order to generalize the patterns found for the  specific case of PetroTiger Ltd., this paper aims to 
identify to which extent the characteristics are applicable for the Latin American region. Despite  the 
choice of focusing this paper on a bribery scandal that took place recently in the Latin American 
region, the firms‘ presence vanished completely from their public radar. From a criminological 
perspective, Clark and Cornish (2001) state that in this case PetroTiger Ltd. rationally calculates its 
costs and benefits. Due to this rational way of thinking the firm decided to employ displacement 
strategy, either disappearing form the attention of the public physically, or visually whereby they 
actually remain at the same place in its operational and strategy, but not manifesting itself on internet 
or other public sources. Based on this, their lack of public presence should be seen as the most valuable 
information this research includes.  
To create a staunch framework of the Latin American region, this paper relies on the three sources of 
Sanyal (2005). These three factors explain the contribution to the level of bribery and corruption in 
society.   
1. The first source is the culture. This research confirms that there is a correlation between the 
level of corruption and the level of Power Distance as mentioned by  Sanyal and Guvenly 
(2009). Since the majority of the Latin American region has a national culture with relative 
high Power Distance, there is more understanding of why more than 66% of all the countries in 
the Americas score lower than a CPI of 50.   
2. The second source is related to the economic drivers. Based on theory of Carmichael (1995) 
three economic reasons are playing a role in the level of corruption. Firstly,  in certain 
countries, normal business transactions cannot be initiated without paying bribes. The second 
reason is the neutralization method whereby ―everybody does it‖ is used as a legitimate 
argument to engage in corruption. The third refers to firms who are in desperate need for 
business will exceed their internal values to make sure that the existence of the firm will still 
be intact. The above motivations come out of the internal values of a firm and as such, 
outcomes may vary for each firm regardless of the region. In order to generalise the economic 
motives for corruption for the Latin American region, there is need for further quantitative 
research.  
3. The third source is related to legislation. As mentioned in previous sections there are several 
worldwide legislation and regulations implemented. The Latin American Organization of the 
Americas also plays an important role for the framework of bribery in corruption. However, 
the success of the publicity of the case of PetroTiger Ltd. is due to the American FCPA 
legislation. The enforcement of the OAS or national Colombian legislation are too weak to 
combat such cases, since these countries do not have the tools, resources and collaboration 
with other countries to minimize bribery (Cragg and Woof 2002, Husted 2002). Although 
Transparency International measured the Corruption Perception Index of Latin America, the 
number of Latin American cases in the media is not in line with the high corruption index. 
Therefore, it is typical in Latin America for there to be more corrupted cases than what is 
reported Due to lack of enforcement not many cases are eventually prosecuted or publicly 
accessible.  
Based on the above, the characteristics of the Latin American region distinguish itself through different 
internal and external sources. In conclusion, the strong cultural power distance, the internal economic 
drivers of Latin American firms and the weak enforcement of legislation describes the level of 
corruption in this region.  
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